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Abstract
In this paper, we initiate a principled study of how the generalization properties of ap-
proximate differential privacy can be used to perform adaptive hypothesis testing, while giving
statistically valid p-value corrections. We do this by observing that the guarantees of algorithms
with bounded approximate max-information are sufficient to correct the p-values of adaptively
chosen hypotheses, and then by proving that algorithms that satisfy (, δ)-differential privacy
have bounded approximate max-information when their inputs are drawn from a product dis-
tribution.
This substantially extends the existing connection between differential privacy and max-
information, which previously was only known to hold for (pure) (, 0)-differential privacy. It
also extends our understanding of max-information as a partially unifying measure controlling
the generalization properties of adaptive data analyses. We also show a lower bound, proving
that (despite the strong composition properties of max-information), when data is drawn from
a product distribution, (, δ)-differentially private algorithms can come first in a composition
with other algorithms satisfying max-information bounds, but not necessarily second if the
composition is required to itself satisfy a nontrivial max-information bound. This, in particular,
implies that the connection between (, δ)-differential privacy and max-information holds only
for inputs drawn from particular distributions, unlike the connection between (, 0)-differential
privacy and max-information.
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1 Introduction
Adaptive Data Analysis refers to the reuse of data to perform analyses suggested by the outcomes
of previously computed statistics on the same data. It is the common case when exploratory data
analysis and confirmatory data analysis are mixed together, and both conducted on the same
dataset. It models both well-defined, self-contained tasks, like selecting a subset of variables using
the LASSO and then fitting a model to the selected variables, and also much harder-to-specify
sequences of analyses, such as those that occur when the same dataset is shared and reused by
multiple researchers.
Recently two lines of work have arisen, in statistics and computer science respectively, aimed
at rigorous statistical understanding of adaptive data analysis. By and large, the goal in the
statistical literature (often called “selective” or “post-selection” inference [BBB+13]) is to derive
valid hypothesis tests and tight confidence intervals around parameter values that arise from very
specific analyses, such as LASSO model selection followed by least squares regression (see e.g.
[FST14, LSST13]). In contrast, the second line of work has aimed for generality (at the possible
expense of giving tight application-specific bounds). This second literature imposes conditions on
the algorithms performing each stage of the analysis, and makes no other assumptions on how,
or in what sequence, the results are used by the data analyst. Two algorithmic constraints that
have recently been shown to guarantee that future analyses will be statistically valid are differential
privacy [DFH+15b, BNS+16] and bounded output description length, which are partially unified
by a measure of information called max-information [DFH+15a]. This paper falls into the second
line of research—specifically, we extend the connection made in [DFH+15b, BNS+16] between
differential privacy and the adaptive estimation of low-sensitivity queries to a more general setting
that includes adaptive hypothesis testing with statistically valid p-values.
Our main technical contribution is a quantitatively tight connection between differential privacy
and a max-information. Max-information is a measure of correlation, similar to Shannon’s mutual
information, which allows bounding the change in the conditional probability of events relative
to their a priori probability. Specifically, we extend a bound on the max-information of (, 0)-
differentially private algorithms, due to [DFH+15a], to the much larger class of (, δ)-differentially
private algorithms.
1.1 Post-Selection Hypothesis Testing
To illustrate an application of our results, we consider a simple model of one-sided hypothesis tests
on real valued test statistics. Let X denote a data domain. A dataset x consists of n elements in
X : x ∈ X n. A hypothesis test is defined by a test statistic φi : X n → R, where we use i to index
different test statistics. Given an output a = φi(x), together with a distribution P over the data
domain, the p-value associated with a and P is simply the probability of observing a value of the
test statistic that is at least as extreme as a, assuming the data was drawn independently from
P: pPi (a) = PrX∼Pn [φi(X) ≥ a]. Note that there may be multiple distributions P over the data
that induce the same distribution over the test statistic. With each test statistic φi, we associate
a null hypothesis H
(i)
0 ⊆ ∆(X ),1 which is simply a collection of such distributions. The p-values
are always computed with respect to a distribution P ∈ H(i)0 , and hence from now on, we elide the
dependence on P and simply write pi(a) to denote the p-value of a test statistic φi evaluated at a.
1∆(X ) denotes the set of probability distributions over X .
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The goal of a hypothesis test is to reject the null hypothesis if the data is not likely to have
been generated from the proposed model, that is, if the underlying distribution from which the
data were drawn was not in H
(i)
0 . By definition, if X truly is drawn from Pn for some P ∈ H(i)0 ,
then pi(φi(X)) is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. A standard approach to hypothesis testing is
to pick a significance level α ∈ [0, 1] (often α = 0.05), compute the value of the test statistic
a = φi(X), and then reject the null hypothesis if pi(a) ≤ α. Under this procedure, the probability
of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis—i.e., of rejecting the null hypothesis when X ∼ Pn
for some P ∈ H(i)0 —is at most α. An incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis is called a false
discovery.
The discussion so far presupposes that φi, the test statistic in question, was chosen indepen-
dently of the dataset X. Let T denote a collection of test statistics, and suppose that we select a
test statistic using a data-dependent selection procedure A : X n → T . If φi = A(X), then rejecting
the null hypothesis when pi(φi(X)) ≤ α may result in a false discovery with probability much larger
than α (indeed, this kind of naive approach to post-selection inference is suspected to be a primary
culprit behind the prevalence of false discovery in empirical science [GL14, WL16, SNS11]). This
is because even if the null hypothesis is true (X ∼ Pn for some P ∈ H(i)0 ), the distribution on
X conditioned on φi = A(X) having been selected need not be Pn. Our goal in studying valid
post-selection hypothesis testing is to find a valid p-value correction function γ : [0, 1] → [0, 1],
which we define as follows:
Definition 1.1 (Valid p-value Correction Function). A function γ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a valid p-value
correction function for a selection procedure A : X n → T if for every significance level α ∈ [0, 1],
the procedure:
1. Select a test statistic φi = A(X) using selection procedure A.
2. Reject the null hypothesis H
(i)
0 if pi(φi(X)) ≤ γ(α).
has probability at most α of resulting in a false discovery.
Necessarily, to give a nontrivial correction function γ, we will need to assume that the selection
procedure A satisfies some useful property. In this paper, we focus on differential privacy, which
is a measure of algorithmic stability, and more generally, max-information, which is defined in
the next subsection. Differential privacy is of particular interest because it is closed under post-
processing and satisfies strong composition properties. This means that, if the test statistics in T
are themselves differentially private, then the selection procedure A can represent the decisions of a
worst-case data analyst, who chooses which hypothesis tests to run in arbitrary ways as a function
of the outcomes of previously selected tests.
Finally, we note that, despite the fact that previous works [DFH+15b, BNS+16] are explicitly
motivated by the problem of false discovery in empirical science, most of the technical results to date
have been about estimating the means of adaptively chosen predicates on the data (i.e., answering
statistical queries) [DFH+15b], and more generally, estimating the values of low-sensitivity (i.e.,
Lipschitz continuous) functions on the dataset [BNS+16, RZ16, WLF16]. These kinds of results do
not apply to the problem of adaptively performing hypothesis tests while generating statistically
valid p-values, because p-values are by definition not low-sensitivity statistics. See Appendix B for
a detailed discussion.
There is one constraint on the selection procedure A that does allow us to give nontrivial p-
value corrections—that A should have bounded max-information. A condition of bounded mutual
information has also been considered [RZ16] to give p-value corrections - but as we discuss in
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Appendix C , it is possible to obtain a strictly stronger guarantee by instead reasoning via max-
information. Max-information is a measure introduced by [DFH+15a], which we discuss next.
1.2 Max-Information (and p-values)
Given two (arbitrarily correlated) random variables X, Z, we let X ⊗ Z denote a random variable
(in a different probability space) obtained by drawing independent copies of X and Z from their
respective marginal distributions. We write log to denote logarithms base 2.
Definition 1.2 (Max-Information [DFH+15a]). Let X and Z be jointly distributed random variables
over the domain (X ,Z). The max-information between X and Z, denoted by I∞(X;Z), is the
minimal value of k such that for every x in the support of X and z in the support of Z, we have
Pr [X = x|Z = z] ≤ 2kPr [X = x]. Alternatively,
I∞(X;Z) = log sup
(x,z)∈(X ,Z)
Pr [(X,Z) = (x, z)]
Pr [X ⊗ Z = (x, z)] .
The β-approximate max-information between X and Z is defined as
Iβ∞(X;Z) = log sup
O⊆(X×Z),
Pr[(X,Z)∈O]>β
Pr [(X,Z) ∈ O]− β
Pr [X ⊗ Z ∈ O] .
We say that an algorithm A : X n → Y has β-approximate max-information of k, denoted as
Iβ∞(A, n) ≤ k, if for every distribution S over elements of X n, we have Iβ∞(X;A(X)) ≤ k when X ∼
S. We say that an algorithm A : X n → Y has β-approximate max-information of k over product
distributions, written Iβ∞,P (A, n) ≤ k, if for every distribution P over X , we have Iβ∞(X;A(X)) ≤ k
when X ∼ Pn.
It follows immediately from the definition that if an algorithm has bounded max-information,
then we can control the probability of “bad events” that arise as a result of the dependence of A(X)
on X: for every event O, we have Pr[(X,A(X)) ∈ O] ≤ 2k Pr[X⊗A(X) ∈ O] + β. For example, if
A is a data-dependent selection procedure for selecting a test statistic, we can derive a valid p-value
correction function γ as a function of a max-information bound on A:
Theorem 1.3. Let A : X n → T be a data-dependent algorithm for selecting a test statistic such
that Iβ∞,P (A, n) ≤ k. Then the following function γ is a valid p-value correction function for A:
γ(α) = max
(
α− β
2k
, 0
)
.
Proof. Fix a distribution Pn from which the dataset X is drawn. If α−β
2k
≤ 0, then the theorem is
trivial, so assume otherwise. Define O ⊂ X n × T to be the event that A selects a test statistic for
which the null hypothesis is true, but its p-value is at most γ(α):
O = {(x, φi) : P ∈ H(i)0 and pi(φi(x)) ≤ γ(α)}
Note that the event O represents exactly those outcomes for which using γ as a p-value correc-
tion function results in a false discovery. Note also that, by definition of the null hypothesis,
Pr[X ⊗ A(X) ∈ O] ≤ γ(α) = α−β
2k
. Hence, by the guarantee that Iβ∞,P (A, n) ≤ k, we have that
Pr[(X,A(X) ∈ O)] is at most 2k ·
(
α−β
2k
)
+ β = α.
3
Because of Theorem 1.3, we are interested in methods for usefully selecting test statistics using
data dependent algorithms A for which we can bound their max-information. It was shown in
[DFH+15a] that algorithms which satisfy pure differential privacy also have a guarantee of bounded
max-information:
Theorem 1.4 (Pure Differential Privacy and Max-Information [DFH+15a]). Let A : X n → Y be
an (, 0)-differentially private algorithm. Then for every β ≥ 0:
I∞(A, n) ≤ log(e) · n and Iβ∞,P (A, n) ≤ log(e) ·
(
2n/2 + 
√
n ln(2/β)/2
)
This connection is powerful, because there are a vast collection of data analyses for which we have
differentially private algorithms— including a growing literature on differentially private hypothesis
tests [JS13, USF13, YFSU14, KS16, DSZ15, She15, WLK15, GLRV16]. However, there is an
important gap: Theorem 1.4 holds only for pure (, 0)-differential privacy, and not for approximate
(, δ)-differential privacy. Many statistical analyses can be performed much more accurately subject
to approximate differential privacy, and it can be easier to analyze private hypothesis tests that
satisfy approximate differential privacy, because the approximate privacy constraint is amenable
to perturbations using Gaussian noise (rather than Laplace noise) [GLRV16]. Most importantly,
for pure differential privacy, the privacy parameter  degrades linearly with the number of analyses
performed, whereas for approximate differential privacy,  need only degrade with the square root of
the number of analyses performed [DRV10]. Hence, if the connection between max-information and
differential privacy held also for approximate differential privacy, it would be possible to perform
quadratically more adaptively chosen statistical tests without requiring a larger p-value correction
factor.
1.3 Our Results
In addition to the framework just described for reasoning about adaptive hypothesis testing, our
main technical contribution is to extend the connection between differential privacy and max-
information to approximate differential privacy. We show the following (see Section 3 for a complete
statement):
Theorem 3.1 (Informal). Let A : X n → Y be an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm. Then,
Iβ∞,P (A, n) = O
(
n2 + n
√
δ

)
for β = O
(
n
√
δ

)
.
It is worth noting several things. First, this bound nearly matches the bound for max-information
over product distributions from Theorem 1.4, except Theorem 3.1 extends the connection to the
substantially more powerful class of (, δ)-differentially private algorithms. The bound is qualita-
tively tight in the sense that despite its generality, it can be used to nearly recover the tight bound
on the generalization properties of differentially private mechanisms for answering low-sensitivity
queries that was proven using a specialized analysis in [BNS+16] (see Appendix D for a comparison).
We also only prove a bound on the max-information for product distributions on the input, and
not for all distributions (that is, we bound Iβ∞,P (A, n) and not Iβ∞(A, n)). A bound for general
distributions would be desirable, since such bounds compose gracefully [DFH+15a]. Unfortunately,
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a bound for general distributions based solely on (, δ)-differential privacy is impossible: a con-
struction of De [De12] implies the existence of (, δ)-differentially private algorithms for which
the max-information between input and output on arbitrary distributions is much larger than the
bound in Theorem 3.1.
One might nevertheless hope that bounds on the max-information under product distributions
can be meaningfully composed. Our second main contribution is a negative result, showing that
such bounds do not compose when algorithms are selected adaptively. Specifically, we analyze the
adaptive composition of two algorithms, the first of which has a small finite range (and hence,
by [DFH+15a], small bounded max-information), and the second of which is (, δ)-differentially
private. We show that the composition of the two algorithms can be used to exactly recover the
input dataset, and hence, the composition does not satisfy any nontrivial max-information bound.
1.3.1 Further Interpretation
Although our presentation thus far has been motivated by p-values, an algorithm A with bounded
max-information allows a data analyst to treat any event A(x) that is a function of the output of
the algorithm “as if” it is independent of the dataset x, up to a correction factor determined by
the max-information bound. Our results thus substantially broaden the class of analyses for which
approximate differential privacy promises generalization guarantees—this class was previously lim-
ited to estimating the values of low-sensitivity numeric valued queries (and more generally, the
outcomes of low-sensitivity optimization problems) [BNS+16].
Our result also further develops the extent to which max-information can be viewed as a unifying
information theoretic measure controlling the generalization properties of adaptive data analysis.
Dwork et al. [DFH+15a] previously showed that algorithms that satisfy bounded output description
length, and algorithms that satisfy pure differential privacy (two constraints known individually to
imply adaptive generalization guarantees), both have bounded max-information. Because bounded
max-information satisfies strong composition properties, this connection implies that algorithms
with bounded output description length and pure differentially private algorithms can be com-
posed in arbitrary order and the resulting composition will still have strong generalization proper-
ties. Our result brings approximate differential privacy partially into this unifying framework. In
particular, when the data is drawn from a product distribution, if an analysis that starts with an
(arbitrary) approximate differentially private computation is followed by an arbitrary composition
of algorithms with bounded max-information, then the resulting composition will satisfy a max-
information bound. However, unlike with compositions consisting solely of bounded description
length mechanisms and pure differentially private mechanisms, which can be composed in arbitrary
order, in this case it is important that the approximate differentially private computation come first.
This is because, even if the dataset x is initially drawn from a product distribution, the conditional
distribution on the data that results after observing the outcome of an initial computation need not
be a product distribution any longer. In fact, the lower bound we prove in Section 4 is an explicit
construction in which the composition of a bounded description length algorithm, followed by an
approximate differentially private algorithm can be used to exactly reconstruct a dataset drawn
from a product distribution (which can in turn be used to arbitrarily overfit that dataset).
Finally, we draw a connection between max-information and mutual information that allows
us to improve on several prior results that dealt with mutual information [MMP+11, RZ16]. We
present the proof in Appendix C.
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Lemma 1.5. Let X,Y be a pair of discrete random variables defined on the same probability space,
where X takes values in a finite set Σ.
• If I(X; Y) ≤ m then, for every k > 0, we have Iβ(k)∞ (X; Y) ≤ k where β(k) = m+0.54k .
• If Iβ∞(X; Y) ≤ k for k > 0 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 3(1−2
−k)
20 , then
2 I(X; Y) ≤ 2k ln(2) + 2β log(|Σ|/2β)
1− 2−k .
We are able to improve on the p-value correction function implicitly given in [RZ16] given a
mutual information bound, by first converting mutual information to a max-information bound and
applying the p-value correction function from this paper. Our main theorem Theorem 3.1 combined
with Lemma 1.5 also obtains an improved bound on the mutual information of approximate differ-
entially private mechanisms from Proposition 4.4 in [MMP+11]3. The following corollary improves
the bound from [MMP+11] in its dependence on |X | from |X |2 · log(1/|X |) to log |X |.
Corollary 1.6. Let A : X n → T be (, δ)-differentially private and X ∼ Pn. If4  ∈ (0, 1/2],  =
Ω
(
1√
n
)
, and δ = O( 
n2
), we then have:
I(X;A(X)) = O
(
n2 + n
√
δ

(
1 + ln
(
1
n
√

δ
)
+ n log |X |
))
.
1.4 Other Related Work
Differential Privacy is an algorithmic stability condition introduced by Dwork et al. [DMNS06]. Its
connection to adaptive data analysis was made by Dwork et al. [DFH+15b] and both strengthened
and generalized by Bassily et al. [BNS+16]. Dwork et al. [DFH+15a] showed that algorithms
with bounded description length outputs have similar guarantees for adaptive data analysis, and
introduced the notion of max-information. Cummings et al. [CLN+16] give a third method—
compression schemes—which can also guarantee validity in adaptive data analysis in the context of
learning. Computational and information theoretic lower bounds for adaptively estimating means
in this framework were proven by Hardt and Ullman [HU14], and Steinke and Ullman [SU15].
Russo and Zou [RZ16] show how to bound the bias of sub-gaussian statistics selected in a data-
dependent manner, in terms of the mutual information between the selection procedure and the
value of the statistics. In particular (using our terminology), they show how to give a valid p-value
correction function in terms of this mutual information. In Appendix C, we demonstrate that if a
bound on the mutual information between the dataset and the output of the selection procedure
is known, then it is possible to substantially improve on the p-value correction function given by
[RZ16] by instead using the mutual information bound to prove a max-information bound on the
selection procedure. [WLF16] study adaptive data analysis in a similar framework to [RZ16], and
give a minimax analysis in a restricted setting.
McGregor et al. [MMP+11], and De [De12] also study (among other things) information the-
oretic bounds satisfied by differentially private algorithms. Together, they prove a result that is
analogous to ours, for mutual information—that while pure differentially private algorithms have
2The bound stated here is looser than that claimed in the conference version [RRST16]; we do not know a proof
of the original claim.
3Thanks to Salil Vadhan for pointing out to us this implication.
4The parameter ranges stated here are different than those claimed in the conference version [RRST16]; this
modification is a result of the change in Lemma 1.5.
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bounded mutual information between their inputs and their outputs, a similar bound holds for
(approximate) (, δ)-differentially private algorithms only if the data is drawn from a product dis-
tribution. We improve quantitatively on this bound.
2 Preliminaries
We will use the following vector notation throughout: x = (x1, · · · , xn), xba = (xa, xa+1, · · · , xb),
(x−i, t) = (x1, · · · , xi−1, t, xi+1, · · · , xn). We denote the distribution of a random variable X as
p(X). In our analysis, jointly distributed random variables (X,Z) will typically be of the form
(X,A(X)) where X ∼ Pn is a dataset of n elements sampled from domain X , and A : X n → Y is
a (randomized) algorithm that maps a dataset to some range Y. We denote by A(X) the random
variable that results when A is applied to a dataset X ∼ Pn (note that here, the randomness is
both over the choice of dataset, and the internal coins of the algorithm). When the input variable
is understood, we will sometimes simply write A.
It will be useful in our analysis to compare the distributions of two random variables. In the
introduction, we define (approximate-) max-information, and we now give some other measures
between distributions. We first define indistinguishability, and then differential privacy.
Definition 2.1 (Indistinguishability [KS14]). Two random variables X,Y taking values in a set D
are (, δ)-indistinguishable, denoted X ≈,δ Y , if for all O ⊆ D,
Pr [X ∈ O] ≤ e · Pr [Y ∈ O] + δ and
Pr [Y ∈ O] ≤ e · Pr [X ∈ O] + δ.
Definition 2.2 (Point-wise indistinguishibility [KS14]). Two random variables X,Z taking values
in a set D are point-wise (, δ)-indistinguishable if with probability at least 1− δ over a ∼ p(X):
e− Pr [Z = a] ≤ Pr [X = a] ≤ e Pr [Z = a] .
Before we define differential privacy, we say that two databases x,x′ ∈ X n are neighboring if
they differ in at most one entry. We now define differential privacy in terms of indistinguishability:
Definition 2.3 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06, DKM+06]). A randomized algorithm A : X n → Y
is (, δ)-differentially private if for all neighboring datasets x,x′ ∈ X n, we have A(x) ≈,δ A(x′).
In the appendix, we give several useful connections between these definitions along with other
more widely known measures between distributions, e.g., KL-divergence, and total-variation dis-
tance.
3 Max-Information for (, δ)-Differentially Private Algorithms
In this section, we prove a bound on approximate max-information for (, δ)-differentially private
algorithms over product distributions.
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Theorem 3.1. Let A : X n → Y be an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm for  ∈ (0, 1/2] and
δ ∈ (0, ). For β = e−2n +O
(
n
√
δ

)
, we have
Iβ∞,P (A, n) = O
(
2n+ n
√
δ

)
.
We will prove Theorem 3.1 over the course of this section, using a number of lemmas. We
first set up some notation. We will sometimes abbreviate conditional probabilities of the form
Pr [X = x|A = a] as Pr [X = x|a] when the random variables are clear from context. Further, for
any x ∈ X n and a ∈ Y, we define
Z(a,x)
def
= log
(
Pr [A = a,X = x]
Pr [A = a] · Pr [X = x]
)
=
n∑
i=1
log
(
Pr
[
Xi = xi|a,xi−11
]
Pr [Xi = xi]
)
(1)
If we can bound Z(a,x) with high probability over (a,x) ∼ p(A(X),X), then we can bound
the approximate max-information by using the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2 ([DFH+15a, Lemma 18]). If Pr [Z(A(X),X) ≥ k] ≤ β, then Iβ∞(A(X); X) ≤ k.
We next define each term in the sum of Z(a,x) as
Zi(a,x
i
1)
def
= log
Pr
[
Xi = xi|a,xi−11
]
Pr [Xi = xi]
. (2)
The plan of the proof is simple: our goal is to apply Azuma’s inequality (Theorem A.8)to
the sum of the Zi’s to achieve a bound on Z with high probability. Applying Azuma’s inequality
requires both understanding the expectation of each term Zi(a,x
i
1), and being able to argue that
each term is bounded. Unfortunately, in our case, the terms are not always bounded – however,
we will be able to show that they are bounded with high probability. This plan is somewhat
complicated by the conditioning in the definition of Zi(a,x
i
1).
First, we argue that we can bound each Zi with high probability. This argument takes place
over the course of Claims 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
Claim 3.3. If A is (, δ)-differentially private and X ∼ Pn, then for each i ∈ [n] and each prefix
xi−11 ∈ X i−1, we have:
(A, Xi)|xi−11 ≈,δ A|xi−11 ⊗Xi.
Proof. Fix any set O ⊆ Y × X and prefix xi−11 ∈ X i−1. We then define the set Oxi = {a ∈ Y :
(a, xi) ∈ O}. Now, we have that:
Pr
[
(A(X), Xi) ∈ O|xi−11
]
=
∑
xi∈X
Pr [Xi = xi] Pr
[A(X) ∈ Oxi |xi−11 , xi]
≤
∑
xi∈X
Pr [Xi = xi]
(
ePr
[A(X) ∈ Oxi |xi−11 , ti]+ δ) ∀ti ∈ X
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Thus, we can multiply both sides of the inequality by Pr [Xi = ti] and sum over all ti ∈ X to get:
Pr
[
(A(X), Xi) ∈ O|xi−11
]
=
∑
ti∈X
Pr [Xi = ti] Pr
[
(A(X), Xi) ∈ O|xi−11
]
≤
∑
xi∈X
∑
ti∈X
Pr [Xi = xi] Pr [Xi = ti]
(
ePr
[A(X) ∈ Oxi |xi−11 , ti]+ δ)
≤ e
∑
xi∈X
Pr [Xi = xi] Pr
[A(X) ∈ Oxi |xi−11 ]+ δ = ePr [A(X)⊗Xi ∈ O|xi−11 ]+ δ.
We follow a similar argument to prove:
Pr
[A(X)⊗Xi ∈ O|xi−11 ] ≤ ePr [(A(X), Xi) ∈ O|xi−11 ]+ δ.
We now define the following set of “good outcomes and prefixes” for any δˆ > 0:
Ei(δˆ) =
{
(a,xi−11 ) : Xi ≈3,δˆ Xi|a,xi−11
}
(3)
We use a technical lemma from [KS14] (stated in the appendix, Lemma A.7), and Claim 3.3 to
derive the following result:
Claim 3.4. If A is (, δ)-differentially private and X ∼ Pn, then for each i ∈ [n] and each prefix
xi−11 ∈ X i−1 we have for δˆ > 0 and δ′
def
= 2δ
δˆ
+ 2δ
1−e− :
Pr
[
(A,Xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ)|xi−11
]
≥ 1− δ′.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma A.7:
Pr
[
(A,Xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ)|xi−11
]
= Pr
[
Xi ≈3,δˆ Xi|A,xi−11 |x
i−1
1
]
= Pr
a∼p
(
A|
xi−11
) [Xi ≈3,δˆ Xi|a,xi−11 ] ≥ 1− δ′
We now define the set of outcome/dataset prefix pairs for which the quantities Zi are not large:
Fi =
{
(a,xi1) : |Zi(a,xi1)| ≤ 6
}
. (4)
Using another technical lemma from [KS14] (which we state in Lemma A.6 in the appendix),
we prove:
Claim 3.5. Given (a,xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ) and δ′′
def
= 2δˆ
1−e−3 we have:
Pr
[
(A,Xi1) ∈ Fi|a,xi−11
] ≥ 1− δ′′.
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Proof. Since (a,xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ), we know that Xi is (3, δˆ)-indistinguishable from Xi|a,xi−11 . Using
Lemma A.6, we know that Xi and Xi|a,xi−11 are point-wise (6, δ
′′)-indistinguishable. Thus, by
definition of Fi and Zi, we have:
Pr
[
(A,Xi1) ∈ Fi|a,xi−11
]
= Pr
[
Zi(A,Xi1) ≤ 6|a,xi−11
]
= Pr
xi∼p
(
Xi|a,xi−11
)
)
[
log
(
Pr[Xi=xi|a,xi−11 ]
Pr[Xi=xi]
)
≤ 6
]
≥ 1− δ′′
We now define the “good” tuples of outcomes and databases as
Gi(δˆ) =
{
(a,xi1) : (a,x
i−1
1 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ) & (a,xi1) ∈ Fi
}
, (5)
G≤i(δˆ) =
{
(a,xi1) : (a, x1) ∈ G1(δˆ), · · · , (a,xi1) ∈ Gi(δˆ)
}
(6)
Claim 3.6. If A is (, δ)-differentially private and X ∼ Pn, then
Pr
[
(A,Xi1) ∈ Gi(δˆ)
]
≥ 1− δ′ − δ′′
for δ′ and δ′′ given in Claim 3.4 and Claim 3.5, respectively.
Proof. We have:
Pr
[
(A,Xi1) /∈ Gi(δˆ)
]
= Pr
[
(A,Xi−11 ) /∈ Ei(δˆ) or (A,Xi1) /∈ Fi)
]
= 1− Pr
[
(A,Xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ) and (A,Xi1) ∈ Fi)
]
= 1−
∑
(a,xi−11 )∈Ei(δˆ)
Pr
[
(A,Xi−11 ) = (a,xi−11 )
]
Pr
[
(A,Xi1) ∈ Fi|a,xi−11
]
≤ 1−
∑
(a,xi−11 )∈Ei(δˆ)
Pr
[
(A,Xi−11 ) = (a,xi−11 )
] · (1− δ′′)
= 1− (1− δ′′)Pr
[
(A,Xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ)
]
≤ 1− (1− δ′′)(1− δ′) = δ′ + δ′′ − δ′δ′′
where the last two inequalities follow from Claim 3.5 and Claim 3.4, respectively.
Having shown a high probability bound on the terms Zi, our next step is to bound their
expectation so that we can continue towards our goal of applying Azuma’s inequality. Note a
complicating factor – throughout the argument, we need to condition on the event (A,Xi1) ∈ Fi to
ensure that Zi has bounded expectation.
We will use the following shorthand notation for conditional expectation:
E
[
Zi(A,Xi1)|a,xi−11 ,Fi
]
def
= E
[
Zi(A,Xi1)|A = a,Xi−11 = xi−11 , (A,Xi1) ∈ Fi
]
,
with similar notation for sets Gi(δˆ),G≤i(δˆ).
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Lemma 3.7. Let A be (, δ)-differentially private and X ∼ Pn. Given (a,xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ), for all
 ∈ (0, 1/2] and δˆ ∈ (0, /15],
E
[
Zi(A,Xi1)|a,xi−11 ,Fi
]
= O(2 + δˆ).
More precisely, E
[
Zi(A,Xi1)|a,xi−11 ,Fi
] ≤ ν(δˆ), where ν(δˆ) is defined in (7).
Proof. Given an outcome and prefix (a,xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ), we define the set of data entries
X (a,xi−11 ) = {xi ∈ X : (a,xi1) ∈ Fi}.
We then have:
E
[
Zi(A,Xi1)|a,xi−11 ,Fi
]
=
∑
xi∈X (a,xi−11 )
Pr
[
Xi = xi|a,xi−11 ,Fi
]
log
(
Pr[Xi=xi|a,xi−11 ]
Pr[Xi=xi]
)
Here, our goal is to mimic the proof of the “advanced composition theorem” of [DRV10] by adding
a term that looks like a KL divergence term (see Definition A.4). In our case, however, the sum
is not over the entire set X , and so it is not a KL-divergence, which leads to some additional
complications. Consider the following term:
∑
xi∈X (a,xi−11 )
Pr [Xi = xi] log
(
Pr[Xi=xi|a,xi−11 ]
Pr[Xi=xi]
)
= Pr
[
Xi ∈ X (a,xi−11 )
] ∑
xi∈X (a,xi−11 )
Pr[Xi=xi]
Pr[Xi∈X (a,xi−11 )]
log
(
Pr[Xi=xi|a,xi−11 ]
Pr[Xi=xi]
)
≤ log
(
Pr[Xi∈X (a,xi−11 )|a,xi−11 ]
Pr[Xi∈X (a,xi−11 )]
)
= log
(
1−Pr[Xi /∈X (a,xi−11 )|a,xi−11 ]
1−Pr[Xi /∈X (a,xi−11 )]
)
where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. Note that, because (a,xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ), we have
for δˆ > 0:
Pr
[
Xi /∈ X (a,xi−11 )
] ≤ e3Pr [Xi /∈ X (a,xi−11 )|a,xi−11 ]+ δˆ.
We now focus on the term Pr
[
Xi /∈ X (a,xi−11 )|a,xi−11
]
. Note that xi /∈ X (a,xi−11 )⇔ (a,xi1) /∈ Fi.
Thus,
Pr
[
Xi /∈ X (a,xi−11 )|a,xi−11
]
= Pr
[
(A,Xi1) /∈ Fi|a,xi−11
] def
= q
Note that q ≤ δ′′ by Claim 3.5. Now, we can bound the following:∑
xi∈X (a,xi−11 )
Pr [Xi = xi] log
(
Pr[Xi=xi|a,xi−11 ]
Pr[Xi=xi]
)
≤ log(1− q)− log(1− (e3q + δˆ))
≤ log(e) · (−q + e3q + δˆ + 2(e3q + δˆ)2) = log(e) · ((e3 − 1)q + δˆ + 2(e3q + δˆ)2)
≤ log(e) ·
(
(e3 − 1) 2δˆ
1− e−3 + δˆ + 2δˆ
2 ·
(
2e3
1− e−3 + 1
)2)
= δˆ(log(e)(2e3 + 1)) + δˆ2
(
2 log(e)
(
4e12 + 4e9 − 3e6 − 2e3 + 1
e6 − 2e3 + 1
))
def
= τ(δˆ)
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where the second inequality follows by using the inequality (−x−2x2) log(e) ≤ log(1−x) ≤ −x log(e)
for 0 < x ≤ 1/2, and as (e3q + δˆ) ≤ 1/2 for  and δˆ bounded as in the lemma statement.
We then use this result to upper bound the expectation we wanted:
E
[
Zi(A,Xi1)|a,xi−11 ,Fi
]
≤
∑
xi∈X (a,xi−11 )
Pr
[
Xi = xi|a,xi−11 ,Fi
]
log
(
Pr[Xi=xi|a,xi−11 ]
Pr[Xi=xi]
)
−
∑
xi∈X (a,xi−11 )
Pr [Xi = xi] log
(
Pr[Xi=xi|a,xi−11 ]
Pr[Xi=xi]
)
+ τ(δˆ)
=
∑
xi∈X (a,xi−11 )
(
Pr
[
Xi = xi|a,xi−11 ,Fi
]− Pr [Xi = xi]) log(Pr[Xi=xi|a,xi−11 ]Pr[Xi=xi]
)
+ τ(δˆ)
≤ 6
∑
xi∈X (a,xi−11 )
|Pr [Xi = xi|a,xi−11 ,Fi]− Pr [Xi = xi] |+ τ(δˆ)
≤ 6
∑
xi∈X (a,xi−11 )
Pr [Xi = xi] max
{
e6
Pr
[
(A,Xi1) ∈ Fi|a,xi−11
] − 1, 1− e−6
Pr
[
(A,Xi1) ∈ Fi|a,xi−11
]}
+ τ(δˆ)
≤ 6
(
e6
1− 2δˆ
1−e−3
− 1
)
+ τ(δˆ) ≤ 6
(
e6
(
1 + 4δˆ
1−e−3
)
− 1
)
+ τ(δˆ)
≤ 722 + δˆ
(
24e6
1−e−3 + log(e)(2e
3 + 1)
)
+ δˆ2
(
2 log(e)
(
4e12 + 4e9 − 3e6 − 2e3 + 1
e6 − 2e3 + 1
))
def
= ν(δˆ) (7)
where the third inequality follows from the definition of Fi, the fourth inequality follows from
Claim 3.5 and the last inequality follows by substituting the value of τ(δˆ), and using the inequalities
1 + y ≤ ey and eky ≤ 1 + eky for y ∈ (0, 0.5], k > 1.
Finally, we need to apply Azuma’s inequality (stated in Theorem A.8)to a set of variables
that are bounded with probability 1, not just with high probability. Towards this end, we define
variables Ti that will match Zi for “good events”, and will be zero otherwise—and hence, are always
bounded:
Ti(a,x
i
1) =
{
Zi(a,x
i
1) if (a,x
i
1) ∈ G≤i(δˆ)
0 otherwise
(8)
The next lemma verifies that the variables Ti indeed satisfy the requirements of Azuma’s in-
equality:
Lemma 3.8. Let A be (, δ)-differentially private and X ∼ Pn. The variables Ti defined in (8) are
bounded by 6 with probability 1, and for any (a,xi−11 ) ∈ Y × X i−1 and δˆ ∈ [0, /15],
E
[
Ti(A,Xi1)|a,xi−11
]
= O(2 + δˆ/), (9)
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where the bound does not depend on n or i. More precisely, E
[
Ti(A,Xi1)|a,xi−11
] ≤ ν(δˆ), where
ν(δˆ) is defined in (7).
Proof. By definition, Ti(A,Xi1) takes values only in [−6, 6]. Thus,
Pr
[|Ti(A,Xi1)| ≤ 6] = 1.
Now, given (a,xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ) ∩ G≤i−1(δˆ), we can see that:
E
[
Ti(A,Xi1)
∣∣∣a,xi−11 ,Gc≤i(δˆ)] = 0.
Further, given (a,xi−11 ) ∈ Ei(δˆ) ∩ G≤i−1(δˆ), we have:
E
[
Ti(A,Xi1)|a,xi−11 ,G≤i(δˆ)
]
=
∑
xi:(a,xi1)∈Fi
Ti(a,x
i
1)Pr
[
Xi = xi|a,xi−11 ,G≤i(δˆ)
]
=
∑
xi:(a,xi1)∈Fi
Zi(a,x
i
1)Pr
[
Xi = xi|a,xi−11 ,G≤i(δˆ)
]
=
∑
xi:(a,xi1)∈Fi
Zi(a,x
i
1)Pr
[
Xi = xi|a,xi−11 ,Fi
]
= E
[
Zi(A,Xi1)|a,xi−11 ,Fi
]
= O(2 + δˆ/)
where the second equality follows from (8), and the last equality follows from Lemma 3.7. For
any (a,xi−11 ) /∈ Ei(δˆ) ∩ G≤i−1(δˆ), we have that the conditional expectation is zero. This proves the
lemma.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. For any constant ν, we have:
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Zi(A,Xi1) > nν + 6t
√
n
]
≤ Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Zi(A,Xi1) > nν + 6t
√
n ∩ (A,X) ∈ G≤n(δˆ)
]
+ Pr
[
(A,X) /∈ G≤n(δˆ)
]
= Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Ti(A,Xi1) > nν + 6t
√
n ∩ (A,X) ∈ G≤n(δˆ)
]
+ Pr
[
(A,X) /∈ G≤n(δˆ)
]
We then substitute ν by ν(δˆ) as defined in Equation (7), and apply a union bound on Pr
[
(A,X) /∈ G≤n(δˆ)
]
using Claim 3.6 to get
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Zi(A,Xi1) > nν(δˆ) + 6t
√
n
]
≤ Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Ti(A,Xi1) > nν(δˆ) + 6t
√
n
]
+ n(δ′ + δ′′)
≤ e−t2/2 + n(δ′ + δ′′)
where the two inequalities follow from Claim 3.6 and Theorem A.8, respectively. Therefore,
Pr
[
Z(A(X),X) > nν(δˆ) + 6t√n
]
≤ e−t2/2 + n(δ′ + δ′′) def= β(t, δˆ)
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From Lemma 3.2, we have I
β(t,δˆ)
∞ (X;A(X)) ≤ nν(δˆ) + 6t√n. We set the parameters t = 
√
2n
and δˆ =
√
δ/15 to obtain our result. Note that setting δˆ =
√
δ/15 does not violate the bounds
on it stated in the statement of Lemma 3.7.
4 A Counterexample to Nontrivial Composition and a Lower Bound
for Non-Product Distributions
It is known that algorithms with bounded description length have bounded approximate max-
information [DFH+15a]. In section 3, we showed that (, δ)-differentially private algorithms have
bounded approximate max-information when the dataset is drawn from a product distribution. In
this section, we show that although approximate max-information composes adaptively [DFH+15a],
one cannot always run a bounded description length algorithm, followed by a differentially private
algorithm, and expect the resulting composition to have strong generalization guarantees. In par-
ticular, this implies that (, δ)-differentially private algorithms cannot have any nontrivial bounded
max-information guarantee over non-product distributions.
Specifically, we give an example of a pair of algorithms A and B such that A has output
description length o(n) for inputs of length n, and B is (, δ)-differentially private, but the adaptive
composition of A followed by B can be used to exactly reconstruct the input database with high
probability. In particular, it is easy to overfit to the input X given B(X;A(X)), and hence, no
nontrivial generalization guarantees are possible. Note that this does not contradict our results
on the max-information of differentially private algorithms for product distributions: even if the
database used as input to A is drawn from a product distribution, the distribution on the database
is no longer a product distribution once conditioned on the output of A. The distribution of B’s
input violates the hypothesis that is used to prove a bound on the max-information of B.
Theorem 4.1. Let X = {0, 1} and Y = {X n ∪ {⊥}}. Let X be a uniformly distributed random
variable over X n. For n > 64e, for every  ∈ (0, 12] , δ ∈ (0, 14], there exists an integer r > 0 and
randomized algorithms A : X n → {0, 1}r, and B : X n × {0, 1}r → Y, such that:
1. r = O
(
log(1/δ) log n

)
and Iβ∞(X;A(X)) ≤ r + log( 1β ) for all β > 0;
2. for every a ∈ {0, 1}r, B(X,a) is (, δ)-differentially private and Iβ∞(X;B(X,a)) ≤ 1 for all
β ≥ 2δ;
3. for every x ∈ X n, with probability at least 1− δ, we have that B(x;A(x))) = x. In particular,
Iβ∞(X,B(X;A(X))) ≥ n− 1 for all 0 < β ≤ 12 − δ.
De [De12] showed that the mutual information of (, δ)-differentially private protocols can be
large: if 1 log
(
1
δ
)
= O(n), then there exists an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm B and a
distribution S such that for X ∼ S, I(X;B(X)) = Ω(n), where I denotes mutual information. De’s
construction also has large approximate max-information.
By the composition theorem for approximate max-information (given in the appendix in Lemma
A.3), our construction implies a similar bound:
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Corollary 4.2. There exists an (, δ)-differentially private mechanism C : X n → Y such that
Iβ2∞ (C, n) ≥ n − 1 − r − log(1/β1) for all β1 ∈ (0, 1/2 − δ) and β2 ∈ (0, 1/2 − δ − β1), where
r = O
(
log(1/δ) log(n)

)
.
We adapt ideas from De’s construction in order to prove Theorem 4.1. In De’s construction, the
input is not drawn from a product distribution—instead, the support of the input distribution is an
error-correcting code, meaning that all points in the support are far from each other in Hamming
distance. For such a distribution, De showed that adding the level of noise required for differential
privacy does not add enough distortion to prevent decoding of the dataset.
Our construction adapts De’s idea. Given as input a uniformly random dataset x, we show a
mechanism A which outputs a short description of a code that contains x. Because this description
is short, A has small max-information. The mechanism B is then parameterized by this short
description of a code. Given the description of a code and the dataset x, B approximates (privately)
the distance from x to the nearest codeword, and outputs that codeword when the distance is small.
When B is composed with A, we show that it outputs the dataset x with high probability.
Before getting into the details of our result, we present some preliminaries for linear codes.
4.1 Preliminaries for Linear Codes
For the current and the next subsections, we limit our scope to F2, i.e., the finite field with 2
elements. First, we define linear codes:
Definition 4.3 (Linear Code). A code C ⊆ {0, 1}n of length n and rank k is called linear iff it is
a k dimensional linear subspace of the vector space Fn2 . The vectors in C are called codewords.
The minimum distance t of a linear code C is t = min
c1,c2∈C
distHamm(c1, c2), where, distHamm(p, q)
denotes the Hamming distance between binary vectors p and q.
We now define parity check matrices, which can be used to construct linear codes. Every linear
code has a parity-check matrix corresponding to it. Thus, given a parity-check matrix, one can
reconstruct the corresponding linear code.
Definition 4.4 (Parity-check matrix). For a linear code C ⊆ {0, 1}n of length n and rank k,
H ∈ {0, 1}(n−k)×n is a parity-check matrix of C iff H is a matrix whose null space is C, i.e., c ∈ C
iff Hc = 0, where 0 represents the zero vector.
Now, we state a theorem which shows the existence of high-rank linear codes when the minimum
distance is less than half the code length:
Theorem 4.5 (From Theorem 5.1.8 in [Lin99]). For every t ∈ (0, n2 ), there exists a linear code of
rank k such that k ≥ n− 3t log(n).
Next, we will define an affine code, which is a translation of a linear code by a fixed vector in
the vector space of the linear code:
Definition 4.6 (Affine Code). Let C ⊆ {0, 1}n be a linear code of length n, rank k and minimum
distance t. For any vector b ∈ {0, 1}n, the code defined by Ca = {c+ b : c ∈ C}, where a = Hb, is
called an affine code.
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Lemma 4.7. If C is a linear code with parity check matrix H and minimum distance t, then the
affine code Ca also has minimum distance t. Further, for all c
′ ∈ Ca, we have Hc′ = a.
Proof. Let c′ ∈ Ca. We know that there exists a c ∈ C such that
Hc′ = H(c+ b) = 0 +Hb = a.
Lastly, we define the concept of a Hamming ball around a point, which is helpful in understand-
ing the point’s neighborhood – i.e., the points close to it with respect to Hamming distance.
Definition 4.8 (Hamming ball). A Hamming ball of radius r around a point p ∈ {0, 1}n, denoted
by Br(p), is the set of strings x ∈ {0, 1}n such that distHamm(x, p) ≤ r.
The volume of a Hamming ball, denoted by V ol(Br), is independent of the point around which
the ball is centered, i.e., for any point p ∈ {0, 1}n:
V ol(Br) =
∣∣Br(p)∣∣ = r∑
i=0
∣∣{x ∈ {0, 1}n : distHamm(x, p) = i}∣∣ = r∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
. (10)
4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
In this section, we define the mechanisms A and B from the theorem statement, and then prove our
result in three parts: First, we show that the first bullet in the theorem statement directly follows
from setting the parameters appropriately and from [DFH+15a]. Next, we show the proof of the
second bullet in two pieces. We start by showing that the algorithm B that we define is differentially
private, and then, we show that the approximate max-information of B is small when its inputs
are chosen independently. Lastly, we prove the third bullet by first showing that the adaptive
composition of A followed by B results in the reconstruction of the input with high probability.
Subsequently, we show that such a composition has large approximate max-information.
Before we define the mechanisms A and B, we must set up some notation. We fix t such that
t =
8 log(1/δ)

+ 1. We know that t ≥ 33 because  ∈ (0, 1/2] and δ ∈ (0, 1/4]. Now, fix an
((n − k) × n) parity-check matrix H for a linear code C ⊆ {0, 1}n of rank k over F2 where t is
the minimum distance of C and k = n− 3t log n, and let r = n− k = 3t log n. We can ensure the
existence of C from Theorem 4.5.
We define the mechanismsA and B from the theorem statement in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2,
respectively.
Brief description of A: For any input x ∈ X n, mechanism A returns a vector ax ∈ {0, 1}r such
that x ∈ Cax , where Cax is an affine code with minimum distance t. This follows as ax = A(x) =
Hx, and from Lemma 4.7, as Cax = {c ∈ X n : Hc = ax}.
Input: x ∈ {0, 1}n
Output: ax ∈ {0, 1}r
1 Return Hx (multiplication in F2).
Algorithm 1: A
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Brief description of B,δ: For any input x ∈ X n and a ∈ {0, 1}r, mechanism B,δ first computes
dx, which is the distance of x from f(x), i.e., the nearest codeword to x in code Ca. Next, it sets
dˆx to be dx perturbed with Laplace noise L ∼ Lap(1/). It returns f(x) if dˆx is below a threshold
w
def
=
(
t− 1
4
− log(1/δ)

)
, and ⊥ otherwise.
Input: x ∈ {0, 1}n (private) and a ∈ {0, 1}r(public)
Output: b ∈ Y
1 Compute the distance of x to the nearest codeword in code Ca. Let
dx = min
c∈Ca
(distHamm(x, c)) and f(x) = arg min
c∈Ca
(distHamm(x, c)) (breaking ties arbitrarily).
2 Let dˆx = dx + L, where L ∼ Lap(1/), and Lap(c) denotes a random variable having
Laplace(0,c) distribution.
3 if dˆx <
(
t− 1
4
− log(1/δ)

)
then
4 Return f(x).
5 else
6 Return ⊥.
7 end
Algorithm 2: B,δ
Now, we present the proof of our theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.1, part 1. Observe that r = O
(
log(1/δ) log n

)
from the value assigned to t.
We know that the second statement holds by the max-information bound for mechanisms with
bounded description length from [DFH+15a].
Proof of Theorem 4.1, part 2. First, we show that B,δ is indeed differentially private.
Lemma 4.9. B,δ(·,a) is (, δ)-differentially private for every a ∈ {0, 1}r.
Proof. We will prove this lemma by following the proof of Proposition 3 in [ST13]. Fix any a ∈
{0, 1}r. Firstly, observe that for every x ∈ {0, 1}n, there are only 2 possible outputs for B,δ(x,a):
⊥ or f(x) = arg min
c∈Ca
(distHamm(x, c)). Also, B,δ(x,a) = f(x) iff dˆx = dx +L < w in Algorithm 2,
where dx = min
c∈Ca
(distHamm(x, c)) and L ∼ Lap(1/).
Now, for any pair of points x and x′ such that distHamm(x,x′) = 1, there are two possible
cases:
1. f(x) 6= f(x′):
In this case,
p
def
= Pr [B,δ(x,a) = f(x)] = Pr
[
dˆx < w
]
= Pr
[
dx + L <
t− 1
4
− log(1/δ)

]
≤ Pr
[
t− 1
2
+ L <
t− 1
4
− log(1/δ)

]
≤ Pr
[
L < − log(1/δ)

]
≤ δ
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where the first inequality follows as f(x) 6= f(x′) implies dx > t− 1
2
, and the last inequality
follows from the tail property of the Laplace distribution. Therefore, Pr [B,δ(x,a) = ⊥] =
1− p.
Similarly, p′ def= Pr [B,δ(x′,a) = f(x′)] ≤ δ, and consequently, Pr [B,δ(x′,a) = ⊥] = 1− p′.
Thus, for any set O ⊆ Y, we can bound the following difference in terms of the total variation
distance TV (B,δ(x,a),B,δ(x′,a)) (defined in the appendix)∣∣Pr [B,δ(x,a) ∈ O]− Pr [B,δ(x′,a) ∈ O] ∣∣ ≤ TV (B,δ(x,a),B,δ(x′,a))
=
(p− 0) + (p′ − 0) + |(1− p)− (1− p′)|
2
=
p+ p′ + |p′ − p|
2
= max{p, p′} ≤ δ
2. f(x) = f(x′):
Observe that for every x′′ ∈ {0, 1}n, the value of dx′′ can change by at most 1 if exactly
one coordinate is changed in x′′. Computing dˆx′′ is then just an instantiation of the Laplace
mechanism, given in the appendix (Theorem A.1). Therefore, dˆx′′ satisfies (, 0)-differential
privacy. Notice that determining whether to output f(x) = f(x′) or ⊥ is a post-processing
function of the (, 0)-differentially private dˆx, and thus, by Theorem A.2, B,δ(·,a) is (, 0)-
differentially private for such inputs.
Therefore, from the above two cases, for any set O ⊆ Y, we have that:
Pr [B,δ(x,a) ∈ O] ≤ e Pr
[B,δ(x′,a) ∈ O]+ δ.
Thus, we can conclude that B,δ(·,a) is (, δ)-differentially private for every a ∈ {0, 1}r.
Next, we look at the outcome of B,δ(X,a) when X is drawn uniformly over X n and a is a fixed
r-bit string. Note that B,δ(X,a) outputs either ⊥ or a codeword of Ca. Thus,
Pr [B,δ(X,a) 6= ⊥] = Pr
[
dˆX < w
]
= Pr
[
dX + L <
(
t− 1
4
− log(1/δ)

)]
(11)
Now, let us define the set D =
{
x ∈ X n : dx <
(
t− 1
4
)}
. If
(
dX + L <
(
t− 1
4
− log(1/δ)

))
,
then either X ∈ D, or L < − log(1/δ)

, or both. Thus,
Pr [B,δ(X,a) 6= ⊥] ≤ Pr [X ∈ D] + Pr
[
L < − log(1/δ)

]
(12)
From the tail bound of the Laplace distribution,
Pr
[
L < − log(1/δ)

]
≤ δ (13)
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Next, we will calculate the probability of X ∈ D. We then assign s def= t−14 . Notice that as the
minimum distance of Ca is t, the Hamming balls B2s of radius 2s around the codewords of Ca are
disjoint and thus we can bound the volume (defined in (10)) of each,
|Ca| · V ol(B2s) ≤ 2n (14)
Therefore,
|Ca| · V ol(Bs) ≤ 2
n · V ol(Bs)
V ol(B2s)
= 2n ·
s∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
2s∑
j=0
(
n
j
) ≤ 2n · s ·
(
n
s
)(
n
2s
) ≤ 2n · s ·
(ne
s
)s
( n
2s
)2s = 2ns(4esn
)s
(15)
where the first inequality follows from equation (14), and the last inequality follows as
(
n
k
)k ≤(
n
k
) ≤ (nek )k for k ≥ 1 (from Appendix C.1 in [CLRS09]).
Thus,
Pr [X ∈ D] = |Ca| · V ol(Bs)
2n
≤ s
(
4es
n
)s
(16)
where the inequality follows from equation (15).
Hence,
Pr [B,δ(X,a) 6= ⊥] ≤ s
(
4es
n
)s
+ δ < s · 2−s + δ (17)
where the first inequality follows from equations (12),(13) and (16), and the last inequality follows
from the fact that n > 8es = 2e(t− 1).
Bounding the term s · 2−s from above, we have
s · 2−s = t− 1
4
· 2(1−t)/4 = 2 log(1/δ)

· 2−2 log(1/δ)/ = 2 log(1/δ)

· δ2/
= (δ log(1/δ))
(
2

· δ(2/)−2
)
δ ≤ δ (18)
where the inequality follows as δ log(1/δ) ≤ 1 for δ ∈ (0, 14], and 2 · δ(2/)−2 ≤ 1 for  ∈ (0, 12] , δ ∈(
0, 14
]
. From equations (17) and (18),
Pr [B,δ(X,a) = ⊥] > 1− 2δ (19)
Now, for any x ∈ X n,
log
(
Pr [(X,B,δ(X,a)) = (x,⊥)]
Pr [X⊗ B,δ(X,a) = (x,⊥)]
)
= log
(
Pr [B,δ(X,a) = ⊥|X = x]
Pr [B,δ(X,a) = ⊥]
)
< log
(
1
1− 2δ
)
≤ log
(
1
1− 0.5
)
= 1 (20)
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where the first inequality follows from equation (19), and the second inequality follows from the
fact that δ ≤ 14 .
We then apply Lemma 3.2 using (19) and (20) to get,
Iβ∞(X;B,δ(X,a)) ≤ 1, for β ≥ 2δ.
Proof of Theorem 4.1, part 3. Let us look at the outcome of B,δ(x,A(x)). First, as x ∈ CA(x),
f(x) = x and dx = 0. Thus, B,δ(x,A(x)) will either return x or ⊥. Furthermore, we can show the
probability of outputting x is high:
Pr
coins
of B,δ
[B,δ(x,A(x)) = x] = Pr
[
dˆx < w
]
≥ Pr
[
dˆx <
log(1/δ)

]
= Pr
[
Lap(1/) <
log(1/δ)

]
≥ 1− δ
where the first inequality follows from the fact that
(
t− 1
4
− log(1/δ)

)
≥ log(1/δ)

, the equality
after it follows since dx = 0, and the last inequality follows from a tail bound of the Laplace
distribution. Thus, for every x ∈ X n,
Pr [B,δ(x,A(x)) = x] ≥ 1− δ. (21)
Consider the event DX = {(x,x) : x ∈ X n}. From equation (21),
Pr [(X,B,δ(X,A(X)) ∈ DX ] ≥ 1− δ. (22)
Also, for b ∈ Y, if b = ⊥, then Pr [X = b] = 0, and if b ∈ X n, then Pr [X = b] = 2−n as X is
drawn uniformly over X n. Thus, for all b ∈ Y,
Pr [(X,b) ∈ DX ] ≤ 2−n.
Hence,
Pr [(X⊗ B,δ(X,A(X))) ∈ DX ] =
∑
b∈Y
Pr [(X,b) ∈ DX ] Pr [B,δ(X,A(X)) = b] ≤ 2−n (23)
Therefore, for β ≤ 1
2
− δ,
Iβ∞(X;B,δ(X,A(X))) = log
 maxO⊆(X×Y),
Pr[(X,B,δ(X,A(X)))∈O]>β
Pr [(X,B,δ(X,A(X))) ∈ O]− β
Pr [(X⊗ B,δ(X,A(X))) ∈ O]

≥ log
(
Pr [(X,B,δ(X,A(X))) ∈ DX ]− β
Pr [(X⊗ B,δ(X,A(X))) ∈ DX ]
)
≥ log
(
1− δ − β
2−n
)
= n+ log(1− δ − β) ≥ n− 1
where the first inequality follows from equation (22) and as (1−δ) > β, the second inequality follows
from equations (22) and (23), and the last inequality follows from the fact that β ≤ 1
2
− δ.
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A Other Useful Probabilistic Tools
We use this section to give an overview of some useful probabilistic tools and their connections
with one another. We start by giving a commonly used differentially private mechanism, called the
Laplace Mechanism, which releases an answer to a query on the dataset with appropriately scaled
Laplace noise. We use this mechanism in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem A.1 (Laplace Mechanism [DMNS06]). Let φ : X n → R be a function such that for any
pair of points x and x′ where distHamm(x,x′) = 1, then we have |φ(x)−φ(x′)| ≤ 1. The mechanism
M(x) = φ(x) + L where L ∼ Lap(1/), is (, 0)-differentially private.
A very useful fact about differentially private mechanisms is that one cannot take the output
of a differentially private mechanism and perform any modification to it that does not depend on
the input itself and make the output any less private.
Theorem A.2 (Post Processing [DMNS06]). Let M : X n → Y be (, δ)-differentially private and
ψ : Y → Y ′ be any function mapping to arbitrary domain Y ′. Then ψ ◦ M is (, δ)-differentially
private.
We have been focusing on approximate max-information throughout this paper, which has the
following strong composition guarantee:
Theorem A.3 (Composition [DFH+15a]). Let A1 : X n → Y and A2 : X n × Y → Z be such that
Iβ1∞ (A1, n) ≤ k1 and Iβ2∞ (A2(·, y), n) ≤ k2 for every y ∈ Y. Then the composition of A1 and A2,
defined to be A(X) = A2(X,A1(X)) satisfies:
Iβ1+β2∞ (A, n) ≤ k1 + k2.
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In our analysis, in addition to max-information, we will use more familiar measures between
two random variables, which we give here:
Definition A.4 (KL Divergence). The KL Divergence between random variables X and Z, denoted
as DKL(X||Z) over domain D is defined as
DKL(X||Z) =
∑
x∈D
Pr [X = x] ln
(
Pr [X = x]
Pr [Z = x]
)
Definition A.5 (Total Variation Distance). The total variation distance between two random
variables X and Z, denoted as TV (X;Z), over domain D is defined as
TV (X,Z) =
1
2
·
∑
x∈D
|Pr [X = x]− Pr [Z = x] |.
In the following lemma, we state some basic connections between max-information, total vari-
ation distance, differential privacy, and indistinguishability:
Lemma A.6. Let X,Z be two random variables over the same domain. We then have:
1. [DFH+15a] Iβ∞(X;Z) ≤ k ⇔ (X,Z) ≈(k ln 2),β X ⊗ Z.
2. [KS14] If X ≈,δ Y then X and Y are pointwise
(
2, 2δ
1−e−
)
-indistinguishable.
Another useful result is from [KS14], which we use in the proof of our main result in Theorem 3.1:
Lemma A.7 (Conditioning Lemma). Suppose that (X,Z) ≈,δ (X ′, Z ′). Then for every δˆ > 0, the
following holds:
Pr
t∼p(Z)
[
X|Z=t ≈3,δˆ X ′|Z′=t
]
≥ 1− 2δ
δˆ
− 2δ
1− e− .
The proof of our main result in Theorem 3.1 also makes use of the following standard concen-
tration inequality:
Theorem A.8 (Azuma’s Inequality). Let C1, · · · , Cn be a sequence of random variables such that
for every i ∈ [n], we have
Pr [|Ci| ≤ α] = 1
and for every fixed prefix Ci−11 = c
i−1
1 , we have
E
[
Ci|ci−11
] ≤ γ,
then for all t ≥ 0, we have
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Ci > nγ + t
√
nα
]
≤ e−t2/2.
We say that a real-valued function f : X n → R has sensitivity ∆ if for all i ∈ [n] and x ∈ X n and
x′i ∈ X , |f(x−i, xi)− f(x−i, x′i)| ≤ ∆. One important use of max-information bounds is that they
imply strong generalization bounds for low sensitivity functions when paired with McDiarmid’s
inequality.
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Theorem A.9 (McDiarmid’s Inequality). Let X1, · · · , Xn be independent random variables with
domain X . Further, let f : X n → R be a function of sensitivity ∆ > 0. Then for every τ > 0 and
µ = E [f(X1, · · · , Xn)] we have
Pr [f(X1, · · · , Xn)− µ ≥ τ ] ≤ exp
(−2τ2
n∆2
)
.
B Sensitivity of p-values
In this section, we demonstrate that the theorem from [BNS+16], which shows that differentially
private algorithms which select low-sensitivity queries cannot overfit, does not give nontrivial gen-
eralization bounds for p-values. We first show that p-values cannot have sensitivity smaller than
.37/
√
n.
Lemma B.1. Let φ : X n → R be a test statistic with null hypothesis H0, and p : R→ [0, 1], where
p(a) = Prx∼Pn [φ(x) ≥ a], and P ∈ H0. The sensitivity of p ◦ φ must be larger than 0.37/
√
n.
Proof. Note that if X ∼ Pn, then p ◦ φ(X) is uniform on [0, 1], and thus, has mean 1/2. From
Theorem A.9, we know that if p ◦ φ has sensitivity ∆, then for any 0 < δ < 1/2, we have:
Pr
[
p ◦ φ(X) ≥ 1/2 + ∆
√
n
2
ln(1/δ)
]
≤ δ.
However, we also know that p ◦ φ(X) is uniform, so that
Pr [p ◦ φ(X) ≥ 1− δ] = δ.
Hence, if ∆ < 1/2−δ√n
2
ln(1/δ)
, we obtain a contradiction:
δ ≥ Pr
[
p ◦ φ(X) ≥ 1/2 + ∆
√
n
2
ln(1/δ)
]
> Pr [p ◦ φ(X) ≥ 1− δ] = δ.
We then set δ = 0.08 to get our stated bound on sensitivity.
Thus, the sensitivity ∆ for the p-value for any test statistic and any null hypothesis must be at
least 0.37/
√
n. This is too large for the following theorem, proven in [BNS+16], to give a nontrivial
guarantee:
Theorem B.2 ([BNS+16]). Let  ∈ (0, 1/3), δ ∈ (0, /4), and n ≥ ln(4/δ)
2
. Let Y denote the class
of ∆-sensitive functions f : X n → R, and let A : X n → Y be an algorithm that is (, δ)-differentially
private. Let X ∼ Pn for some distribution P over X , and let q = A(X). Then:
Pr
X,A
[|q(Pn)− q(X)| ≥ 18∆n] < δ

.
When we attempt to apply this theorem to a p-value, we see that the error it guarantees, by
Lemma B.1, is at least: 18∆n ≥ 18(.37)√n. However, the theorem is only valid for n ≥ 1
2
ln
(
4
δ
)
.
Plugging this in, we see that 18(.37)
√
n ≥ 1, which is a trivial error guarantee for p-values (which
take values in [0, 1]).
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C General Conversion between Max-Information and Mutual In-
formation, and its Consequences
We give here a proof of Lemma 1.5.
Proof of Lemma 1.5. We first prove the first direction of the lemma. We define a set G(k) =
{(x,y) : Z(x,y) ≤ k} where Z(x,y) = log
(
Pr[(X,Y)=(x,y)]
Pr[X⊗Y=(x,y)]
)
, and β(k) to be the quantity such that
Pr [(X,Y) ∈ G(k)] = 1− β(k). We then have:
m ≥
∑
(x,y)∈G(k)
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)]Z(x,y) +
∑
(x,y)/∈G(k)
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)]Z(x,y)
≥
∑
(x,y)∈G(k)
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)]Z(x,y) + kβ(k) (24)
Also, we have:
−
∑
(x,y)∈G(k)
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)]
Pr [(X,Y) ∈ G(k)] Z(x,y) ≤ log
(
Pr [X⊗Y ∈ G(k)]
Pr [(X,Y) ∈ G(k)]
)
≤ log
(
1
1− β(k)
)
where the first inequality follows from applying Jensen’s inequality.
By rearranging terms, we obtain:∑
(x,y)∈G(k)
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)] · Z(x,y) ≥ −(1− β(k)) · log
(
1
1− β(k)
)
.
Plugging the above in Equation (24), we obtain:
m ≥ −(1− β(k)) log
(
1
1− β(k)
)
+ kβ(k).
Thus,
k ≤
m+ (1− β(k)) log
(
1
1−β(k)
)
β(k)
≤ m+ 0.54
β(k)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the function (1−w) log(1/(1−w)) is maximized
at w = (e− 1)/e (and takes value < 0.54). Solving for β(k) gives the claimed bound.
We now prove the second direction of the lemma. Note that we can use Lemma A.6 to say
that (X,Y) and (X⊗Y) are point-wise (2k ln(2), β′) indistinguishable, for β′ = 2β
1−2−k . Note that
β′ ≤ 0.3 as β ∈
[
0, 3(1−2
−k)
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]
. We now define the following “bad” set B:
B =
{
(x,y) ∈ Σ× Σ : ln
(
(X,Y) = (x,y)
X⊗Y = (x,y)
)
> 2k ln(2)
}
.
From the definition of point-wise indistinguishability, we have:
I(X; Y) ≤ 2k ln(2) +
∑
(x,y)∈B
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)] ln
(
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)]
Pr [X = x] Pr [Y = y]
)
. (25)
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Now, if set B is empty, we get from (25) that:
I(X; Y) ≤ 2k ln(2)
which trivially gives us the claimed bound.
However, if set B is non-empty, we then consider the mutual information conditioned on the
event (X,Y) ∈ B. We will write X′ for the random variable X conditioned on (X,Y) ∈ B, and
Y′ for the random variable Y conditioned on the same event. We can then obtain the following
bound, where we write H(W ) to denote the entropy of random variable W :
I(X′; Y′) ≤ H(X′) ≤ log |Σ|.
We can then make a relation between the mutual information I(X′,Y′) and the sum of terms over
B in (25). Note that, for (x,y) ∈ B, we have from Bayes’ rule:
Pr [(X,Y) ∈ B] Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)|B] = Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)] .
This then gives us the following bound:∑
(x,y)∈B
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)]
Pr [(X,Y) ∈ B] ln
(
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)]
Pr [(X,Y) ∈ B] Pr [X = x|B] Pr [Y = y|B]
)
≤ log |Σ|. (26)
Note that Pr [X = x|B] ≤ Pr[X=x]Pr[(X,Y)∈B] , and similarly, Pr [Y = y|B] ≤ Pr[Y=y]Pr[(X,Y)∈B] . From (26), we
have: ∑
(x,y)∈B
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)] ln
(
Pr [(X,Y) = (x,y)]
Pr [X = x] Pr [Y = y]
)
≤ Pr [(X,Y) ∈ B] log |Σ|+ Pr [(X,Y) ∈ B] ln (1/Pr [(X,Y) ∈ B])
≤ β′(log |Σ|+ ln(1/β′))
=
2β
1− 2−k
(
log |Σ|+ ln
(
1− 2−k
2β
))
≤ 2β log(|Σ|/2β)
1− 2−k
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Pr [(X,Y) ∈ B] ≤ β′ and w ln(1/w) ≤ β′ ln(1/β′)
when 0 ≤ w ≤ β′ ≤ 0.3. Substituting the sum of terms over B in (25) by the above gives us the
claimed bound.
We have already shown how Lemma 1.5 along with Theorem 3.1 can be used to improve a
bound from [MMP+11]. We now state another corollary which improves on a result from [RZ16].
In the introduction, we proved a simple theorem about how to correct p-values (using a valid
p-value correction function – Definition 1.1) given a bound on the max-information between the
input dataset and the test-statistic selection procedure A (Theorem 1.3). We note that we can
easily extend the definition of null hypotheses given in the introduction (and hence p-values and
correction functions), to allow for distributions S over X n that need not be product distributions.
In fact, we can restate Theorem 1.3 in terms of non-product distributions:
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Theorem C.1. Let A : X n → T be a data-dependent algorithm for selecting a test statistic such
that Iβ∞(A, n) ≤ k. Then the following function γ is a valid p-value correction function for A:
γ(α) = max
(
α− β
2k
, 0
)
.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 1.3, except we fix an arbitrary
(perhaps non-product) distribution S from which the dataset X is drawn.
Previously, Russo and Zou [RZ16] have given a method to correct p-values given a bound
on the mutual information between the input data and the test-statistic selection procedure.5 In
Lemma 1.5, we observe that if we had a bound on the mutual information between the input data
and the test-statistic procedure, this would imply a bound on the max-information that would be
sufficiently strong so that our Theorem C.1 would give us the following corollary:
Corollary C.2. Let A : X n → T be a test-statistic selection procedure such that I(X;A(X)) ≤ m.
Then γ(α) is a valid p-value correction function, where:
γ(α) =
α
2
· 2−2α (m+0.54).
Proof. From Lemma 1.5, we know that for any k > 0, I
β(k)
∞ (A, n) ≤ k, where β(k) ≤ m+0.54k .
Hence, from Theorem C.1, we know that for any choice of k > 0, γ(α) is a valid p-value correction
function where:
γ(α) =
α− m+0.54k
2k
.
Choosing k = 2(m+0.54)α gives our claimed bound.
We now show that this gives us a strictly improved p-value correction function than the bound
given by [RZ16], which we state here using our terminology.
Theorem C.3 ([RZ16] Proposition 7). Let A : X n → T be a test-statistic selection procedure such
that I(X;A(X)) ≤ m (where I denotes mutual information). If we define φi = A(X), then for
every γ ∈ [0, 1]:
Pr [pi(φi(X)) ≤ γ] ≤ γ +
√
m
ln(1/2γ)
.
If we want to set parameters so that the probability of a false discovery is at most α, then in
particular, we must pick γ such that
√
m
ln(1/2γ) ≤ α. Equivalently, solving for α, the best valid
p-value correction function implied by the bound of [RZ16] must satisfy:
γRZ(α) ≤ min
{
α
2
,
1
2
· 2− log(e)m/α2
}
.
5Actually, [RZ16] do not explicitly model the dataset, and instead give a bound in terms of the mutual information
between the test-statistics themselves and the test-statistic selection procedure. We could also prove bounds with
this dependence, by viewing our input data to be the value of the given test-statistics, however for consistency, we
will discuss all bounds in terms of the mutual information between the data and the selection procedure.
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We can obtain a better bound by instead arguing via max-information combining Lemma 1.5
with Theorem C.1, we can derive a valid p-value correction function given a bound on the mutual
information between the data and the selection procedure:
Comparing the p-value correction function γ(α) derived above, with the function γRZ(α) that
arises from [RZ16], we see that the version above has an exponentially improved dependence on 1/α.
Moreover, it almost always gives a better correction factor in practice: for any value of α ≤ 0.05,
the function γ(α) derived above improves over γRZ(α) whenever the mutual information bound
m ≥ 0.05 (whereas, we would naturally expect the mutual information to be m  1, and to scale
with n).
D Rederiving Generalization for Low Sensitivity Queries, and a
Comparison with the Bounds of [BNS+16]
In this section, we use the bound from our main theorem (Theorem 3.1) to rederive known results
for the generalization properties of differentially private algorithms which select low sensitivity
queries. Our bounds do not exactly – but nearly – match the tight bounds for this problem, given
in [BNS+16]. This implies a limit on the extent to which our main theorem can be quantitatively
improved, despite its generality.
The goal of generalization bounds for low sensitivity queries is to argue that with high proba-
bility, if a low sensitivity function f : X n → R = A(x) is chosen in a data-dependent way when x is
sampled from a product distribution Pn, then the value of the function on the realized data f(x) is
close to its expectation f(Pn) def= EX∼Pn [f(X)]. If f were selected in a data-independent manner,
this would follow from McDiarmid’s inequality. No bound like this is true for arbitrary selection
procedures A, but a tight bound by [BNS+16] is known when A is (, δ)-differentially private – we
have already quoted it, as Theorem B.2.
Using our main theorem (Theorem 3.1), together with McDiarmid’s inequality (Theorem A.9),
we can derive a comparable statement to Theorem B.2:
Theorem D.1. Let  ∈ (0, 1), δ = O(5), and n = Ω
(
log(/δ)
2
)
. Let Y denote the class of ∆-
sensitive functions f : X n → R, and let A : X n → Y be an algorithm that is (, δ)-differentially
private. Let X ∼ Pn for some distribution P over X , and let q = A(X). Then there exists a
constant C such that:
Pr
X,A
[|q(Pn)− q(X)| ≥ C∆n] < n
√
δ

Proof. If A satisfied Iβ∞(X;A(X)) ≤ k, then McDiarmid’s inequality (Theorem A.9) paired with
Definition 1.2 would imply:
Pr
X,A
[|q(Pn)− q(X)| ≥ C∆n] < 2k exp (−2C22n)+ β
Because A is (, δ)-differentially private, Theorem 3.1 implies that indeed Iβ∞(X;A(X)) ≤ k for
k = O
(
n2 + n
√
δ

)
= O
(
2n
)
and β = O
(
n
√
δ

)
+ e−2n = O
(
n
√
δ

)
, and the claimed bound
follows.
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Because Theorem B.2 is asymptotically tight, this implies a limit on the extent to which The-
orem 3.1 can be quantitatively improved.
For comparison, note that the generalization bound for (, δ)-differentially private mechanisms
given in Theorem B.2 differs by only constants from the generalization bound proven via the max-
information approach for (, δ′)-differentially private mechanisms, where:
δ′ =
δ2
n2
Note that in most applications (including the best known mechanism for answering large num-
bers of low sensitivity queries privately— the median mechanism [RR10] as analyzed in [DR14]
Theorem 5.10), the accuracy of a differentially private algorithm scales with
√
log(1/δ)
n (ignoring
other relevant parameters). In such cases, using the bound derived from the max-information ap-
proach yields an accuracy that is worse than the bound from Theorem B.2 by an additive term
that is O
(√
log(n)
n
)
.
E Omitted Proofs
Proof of Corollary 4.2. We use the same algorithms A and B from Theorem 4.1. Suppose that for
all a ∈ {0, 1}r and 0 < β2 < 1/2− δ − β1 for any β1 ∈ (0, 1/2− δ), we have:
Iβ2∞ (B(·,a), n) < n− 1− r − log(1/β1).
Note that because A has bounded description length r, we can bound Iβ1∞ (A, n) ≤ r+ log(1/β1) for
any β1 > 0 [DFH
+15a]. We then apply the composition theorem for max-information mechanisms,
Theorem A.3, to obtain:
Iβ2+β1∞ (B ◦ A, n) < n− 1.
However, this contradicts Theorem 4.1, because for any β < 1/2− δ,
Iβ∞(B ◦ A, n) ≥ Iβ∞,P (B ◦ A, n) ≥ n− 1.
Thus, we know that there exists some a∗ ∈ {0, 1}r and (non-product) distribution X ∼ S such
that:
Iβ2∞ (X;B(X,a∗) ≥ n− 1− r − log(1/β1).
We then define C : X n → Y to be C(x) = B(x,a∗). Hence,
Iβ2∞ (C, n) ≥ Iβ2∞ (X; C(X)) ≥ n− 1− r − log(1/β1)
which completes the proof.
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